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BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR.-

Eminent Domain, "Public Use," and
the Conundrum of Original Intent
ABSTRACT
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitutionreads,
in part, that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Severalstate constitutions,both earlyand
modern, place similarpublic use limitations on the eminent domain
power. As the United States underwent the IndustrialRevolution in
the 1800s, new mechanisms of property distribution appeared that
enabledquasi-publiccorporations,especially railroadcorporations,to
take others 'propertyfor theirown use. Some statecourts reacted to the
rise of the corporation by reading the public use limitation strictly,
requiringactualpublic access to the property taken in orderto justify
the taking. Other courts adhered to a broader interpretation,which
requiredonly that the public benefit in some fashion from the taking.
This debate produced a persistent confusion in legal doctrine that
lasted for decades and obscured earlier, pre-nineteenth century
Anglo-American definitions of the term "public use." The history of
takings in English law, and in the American colonialand early state
and nationalexperience, suggests that the "public benefit" theory is
more in line with the early meaning of the term than is the "actual
use" theory. Late twentieth century applicationof the "public benefit"
theory, now almost universal in the United States, is thus congruent
with the early meaning of "public use."
Farewel happy Fields
Where Joy for ever dwells: Hail horrours,hail
Infernal world, and thou profoundestHell
Receive thy new Possessor:One who brings
A mind not to be chang'd by Place or Time.
The mind is its own place, and in it self
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.
What matter where, if I be still the same,
And what I should be, all but less than he
Whom Thunder hath made greater?'
* Assistant Professor of History, Elon College. The author is grateful to Professors
Molly S. McUsic and John V. Orth of the University of North Carolina School of Law.
Special thanks are due to Christine A. Evans of the University of North Carolina School of
Law and to Dr. Carol K.W. Melton of the Elon College History Department.
1. John Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. 1, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 17 (1931).
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INTRODUCTION

In the dawn of the age of the railroad, Henry David Thoreau
withdrew to the environs of Walden Pond. There, contemplating both
nature and industry, he wrote:
[Wihen I hear the iron horse make the hills echo with his snort
like thunder, shaking the earth with his feet, and breathing fire
and smoke from his nostrils, (what kind of winged horse or fiery
dragon they will put into the new Mythology I don't know,) it
seems as if the earth had got a race now worthy to inhabit it. If
all were as it seems, and men made the elements their servants
for noble ends! If the cloud that hangs over the engine were...
as beneficent to men as that which floats over the farmer's fields,
then the elements and Nature herself would cheerfully
accompany men on their errands and be their escort.2
This new race of Thoreau's fed not only upon wood and capital; it
also required land over which its rails could run. State legislatures, sensing
the great benefits that would flow from such stretches of track, often
allowed the early, quasi-public railroad corporations to exercise the power
of eminent domain so that they might achieve their goals of expansion.3
Eventually, however, Americans began to realize that such corporations
could use this power to acquire an individual's land without the latter's
actual consent. Thus individuals turned to the courts to protect themselves
from what they soon came to see as a dangerous new power, seeking some
means of salvation.4
Many others, however, saw their future not in transportation,
industry, and related businesses but rather in the land itself.' One of these
was John Bowman, owner of a plantation on the banks of the Ocmulgee
River in Bibb County, Georgia.6 The life of the South, and of its residents,
in those days was bound up closely in the soil.' One would be mistaken,
however, were she to presume that Bowman's was an insular existence;8

2. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN 127 (Charles E. Merrill ed., 1969).
3. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 182 (2d ed. 1985).
4. See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
5. See CLEMENT EATON, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN CIVILIZATION 221-22 (1961).
6. Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37, 37-38 (1850).
7. See EATON, supra note 5, at 98 (observing that "the vast majority of Southern
families lived on small farms[,J" although "the plantation type of life set the tone of
Southern society").
8. Plantations generally grew cash crops, which, of course, necessitated commerce and
transportation of the goods. EATON, supra note 5, at 99-100. Many planters, moreover, "did
not regard it beneath their dignity to engage in money-making enterprises other than
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planters needed access to the outside world in order to profit from their
agrarian ventures. So it was that in the spring of 1848, Bowman asked the
county court to allow him to run a private way from his lands to the
Forsyth Road. 9 The court agreed, and Bowman established his
way--directly through the property of one Thomas Brewer."0
Brewer, understandably, was not happy about this intrusion. When
he blocked the road, and Bowman secured an injunction against him,"
Brewer attacked the constitutionality of the 1834 state act that purported to
allow condemnation for the benefit of a private citizen."2 The act would
have been invalid, Brewer maintained,
even had the government
3
compensated him, which it had not.'
This lack of a compensation requirement proved fatal to the statute;
the court agreed with Brewer and found the fundamental law of the land 4
to require remuneration. Having thus disposed of the issue, however, the
court then undertook to consider, in dictum, whether the statute would
have been invalid even if it had required a public (as opposed to a private)
purpose. 5 Instead of discussing whether a taking for private use was
permissible, however, Justice Warner pondered the meaning of "public
use."' 6 He observed that the roads constructed pursuant to the 1834 act
allowed citizens not only to see to their private interests, but to discharge
their public duties as well. 7 Without private connecting roads, Justice
Warner noted, a land-locked party (of whom the state had many) would be

farming. Planters operated ferries, grist mills, lumber mills, stores, and contracted to dig
canals and construct roadbeds of railroads with their slave gangs." Id. at 222.
9. Brewer, 9 Ga. at 37-38.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id.
12. Act of Dec. 20, 1834, 1834 Ga. Laws 199-200. The statute reads in part:
ITIhe Inferior Courts of the several counties in this State are hereby
authorized and empowered, on application (whenever in their opinion it
shall seem reasonable and just), to grant settlement-roads or private ways
to individuals to go from and return to his, her, or their farm or place of
residence.
Id. § 1, at 199.
13. Brewer, 9 Ga. at 39. The restrictions of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause did
not, as of 1850, apply to state governments. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250-51 (1833) ("[Tlhe provision in the fifth amendment.., declaring that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation ...is not applicable to the
legislation of the states"). The Brewer court found, however, that natural, or "fundamental,"
law accomplished the same end regarding state law as the federal Takings Clause did
respecting federal law. See Brewer, 9 Ga. at 39. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
14. Brewer, 9 Ga. at 39.
15. Id. 39-41 (dictum).
16. Id. at 39 (dictum).
17. Id. at 40 (dictum).
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unable to perform such duties." "[HIe cannot," wrote the jurist, "get out
to vote at elections, to perform jury or road duty, to perform either militia
or patrol duty, to give evidence in the courts of Justice, or to carry the
productions of his farm to market" 9 -this last being a pointed reference
to the public interest in commercial and economic development.' Thus,
Warner concluded, the act of 1834 clearly allowed takings for public use,2
even though nothing in the opinion indicates that Bowman himself was a
registered voter, a militiaman, or a past or present participant in a court
proceeding other than his own--even though, in short, the record revealed
no actual public use in this instance. A potential public use, of the sort the
court contemplated, would suffice to render such a statute valid, assuming
that it provided for compensation. 22
In adopting this broad view of "public use" rather than a narrow
interpretation that would have required actual public occupation, access,
or possession of the road and not just a public benefit,' the Georgia
Supreme Court came into conflict with decisions in other states,24 a fact
that Justice Warner recognized.' The narrow definition that other states
had accepted was apparently a reaction to the rise of railroad, and other
corporations, which apparently put the security of private lands in jeopardy
of private condemnation.' These conflicting state approaches exemplify
an emerging doctrinal battle that would continue for the rest of the
century.' One relatively recent account describes the debate thus:
The predise meaning of the "public use" requirement has varied
over time and according to the type of taking involved. The
conventional statement of the historical case development holds

18. Id.
19. Id.

20. See supra note 8.
21. Brewer, 9 Ga. at 40 (dictum). The court obviously made these statements to assure
the legislature that a replacement for the 1834 act would be acceptable as long as it provided
compensation. See id. at 41 (dictum).
22. One could argue that Bowman needed access across Brewer's land in order to travel
to court and enjoin Brewer from blocking Bowman's access across Brewer's land. Despite
its circularity, Justice Warner may have found even this argument sufficient, given his broad
view of the meaning of "public use." See id. at 40-41 (dictum).
23. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 205 (1978); see also infra
note 28 and accompanying text (defining these terms).
24. See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9,31 Am. Dec. 313 (N.Y.
1837); see also infra notes 161-172 and accompanying text (discussing Bloodgood).
25. Brewer, 9 Ga. at 41 (dictum) (citing Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843)).
26. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 182.
27. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599, 605-06 (1949) ("By the beginning of the [twentieth] century, there had
developed a massive body of [public use] case law, irreconcilable in its inconsistency,
confusing in its detail and defiant of all attempts at classification").
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that there are two basic opposing views of the meaning of
that the term means advantage or benefit to the
"public use": (1)
public, (the so-called broad view) ; and (2) that it means actual
use or right to use of the condemned property by the public (the
so-called narrow view).'
The doctrinal confusion was remarkably persistent.' Not until
Berman v. Parker," decided over a century after Brewer, did the United
States Supreme Court help end the debate by embracing fully the broad
"public benefit" doctrine. In doing so, the Berman Court allowed the sale or
lease, to private parties, of property condemned as part of an urban renewal
scheme. 31
Today, in Berman's wake, the broad view holds the field
completely. The Court confirmed as much in HawaiiHousing Authority v.
Midkiff,32 in which it approved an even more far-reaching governmental
redistribution of privately owned lands to other private parties.3 Such an

28. Berger, supra note 23, at 205 (footnotes omitted).
29. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
31. Id. at 33-34. Berman involved the condemnation, by the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency, of the plaintiffs' department store and residential property
as part of a redevelopment project. Id. at 28-31. The agency had statutory authority to sell
or lease portions of condemned property to private parties in order to attain its
redevelopment goals. Id. at 30. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the agency's
condemnation of their property violated the public use requirement. Id. at 31. In affirming
a finding in favor of the agency, the Supreme Court adopted a deferential, very broad
definition of public use. "Subject to specific constitutional limitations," wrote Justice Douglas
for the Court, "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared and
is well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian
of public needs to be served by social legislation. . .

."

Id. at 32.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which
it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means
chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area.
Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one
businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine,
once the public purpose has been established.
Id. at 33.
32. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
33. In Midkiff, the Hawaii state legislature had acted to break up the ownership of
private land in the state, a very high percentage of which was in the hands of fewer than
100 owners. Id. at 232. The legislature provided for condemnation of large residential tracts
of land that the landowners were leasing to their tenants, and for subsequent transfer of the
title, for a price, to those tenants, at the tenants' behest. Id. at 233. Perhaps inevitably, some
of the landowners sought to enjoin the law's enforcement and asked the federal courts to
declare it unconstitutional. Id. at 234-35. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found a public use violation, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 245. In Midkiff the
Court went even further than it had in Berman. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
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interpretation has rendered the "public use" requirement almost a mere
matter of form.Y In light of the doctrinal struggles of the 1800s this
definitive result, though a blessing to the practitioner, is troubling both to
the scholar and often to attorneys on the losing side of condemnation
proceedings.
The conflicting interpretations of the early industrial years has
partially obscured an older meaning of public use--a meaning that
predates not only the Fifth Amendment, but the American Revolution as
well.3
This early meaning undoubtedly influenced the framers'
generation as its members drafted, debated, and ratified the Fifth
Amendment and state public use provisions. In order to perceive it, one
must part the curtain of the 1800s and move into the realm of the preceding

stressed the applicability of a "rational relationship" test in public use cases.
To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that 'one person's
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person
without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid.'
...But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.
Id. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
34. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-43; see also Alois V. Gross, Annotation, When is Taking
of Property for "Public Use" So as to be Permissible Under Federal Constitution if Just
Compensation is Provided-Supreme Court Cases, 81 L. Ed. 2d 93i (1986) (discussing the
Supreme Court's treatment of the public use issue). For an earlier compilation of federal and
state cases discussing the public use/public benefit distinction, see Annotation, PublicBenefit
or Convenience as Distinguishedfrom Use by the Public as Ground for the Exercise of the Power
of Eminent Domain, 54 A.L.R. 7 (1928).
A celebrated, and extreme, case in which the judiciary effectively rendered the public use
requirement nugatory is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 405 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981). In Poletown the Michigan Supreme Court refused to uphold residential
landowners' "public use" objections to Detroit's plan to transfer title from the owners to
General Motors Corporation, so that the latter could construct a new factory. Id. at 457. Here
the court focused not on the identity of the recipient of the property, but instead the
economic benefit to the community. Interpreting the Michigan Constitution's Public Use
Clause, the court observed that eminent domain would "accomplish the essential public
purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community.
The benefit to a private interest is merely incidental." Id. at 459. Cf. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
241-42 (in which the Supreme Court also emphasized the economic benefits that would flow
from the property redistribution).
In recent years, however, courts have still occasionally found purely private purposes
in some takings and invalidated the condemnations on that ground. See, e.g., Steen v.
Columbo, 722 S.W.2d 648,649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Recent scholarship, however, has raised
the argument that the framers intended takings for private use to be not only permissible,
but permissible without compensation. See Jed Rubinfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1079,
1120 (1993).
35. See Berger, supra note 23, at 205.
36. See infra notes 56-151 and accompanying text.
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century, and even earlier.' While the inquiry in itself is fascinating, one
would do well not to ignore its utilitarian object, conducting the
investigation with reference to the Berman/Midkiff doctrines that
predominate today. This existing state of public use law dictates the
appropriate question: Is this recent interpretation of public use consistent
with the original meaning of that concept?
II.
A.

ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION OF "PUBLIC USE"

The Problem Presented

One who attempts to discover original intent confronts many
problems, not the least of which is the question of whose intent matters.
Several potential candidates may exist. Among them may be the author of
a statute, regulation, or constitutional phrase; the members of the majority
who voted for it; the representative body or constitutional convention as a
whole, including the measure's opponents; or even the entire community,
which, after all, may be the audience the author intends to address.'
A related problem is that of the dominant political philosophy
(assuming that a dominant one existed at all) of the relevant individuals,
groups, and/or eras. The generation of Americans that produced the early
state constitutions, the Federal Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, had
among them a variety of Weltanschauungen. One relatively recent debate,
for instance, has stressed the presence of discrete "liberal" and "republican"
ideologies." Another view highlights the existence of, and interplay
between, separate Protestant and Enlightenment strains of thought in late
eighteenth century America, and how that interaction influenced the
development of American thought of the time.' Of course, the researcher
may also face practical problems of limited or incomplete sources, which,
if severe enough, may only distort or confuse matters rather than clarify
them.
Such problems surround original intent as it relates to the public
use question. Nevertheless, historical analysis of original intent may serve
an important function. While much maligned, 4 and often
37. See infra notes 56-151 and accompanying text.
38. See STANLEY FISH, ISTHERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 14 (1980).
39. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 818-25 (1995) (discussing the republican/liberal
dichotomy as it relates to the issue of eminent domain).
40. See HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA xi-xii (1976).

41. See, e.g., Continental Can v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (decrying an intentionalist approach within the context of federal
statutory interpretation); FISH, supra note 38, at 1-21 (questioning the existence of an
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indeterminate,4' the fact remains that courts and judges can, and do,
utilize intent-based arguments.' The well-versed property lawyer,
therefore, would do well to have in his arsenal the weapon of original
intent.
The first problem the researcher faces in thus arming herself is the
practical one of source availability. While many source collections exist on
the subject of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution," those dealing
with the Bill of Rights are less satisfactory. 0s In the absence of clear
statements about the Takings Clause itself, then, one must find other
sources to consult.
Because the framers themselves often drew upon legal and political
history*-both their own and Europe's (and especially that of
England 47)-that history is an excellent starting point. One may then
proceed to examine other statements and acts of the framers' own
generation in order to gain insight into what they understood the public
use limitation to mean.' The present study thus focuses upon the English

originalist meaning). For a discussion of scholars' limited use of original intent within the
context of the Takings Clause, see Treanor, supra note 39, at 782, 811-12. See also RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985)
("Historical arguments have played virtually no role in the actual interpretation of the
[Takings Cilause").
42. See EPSTEIN at 29.
43. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-65 (1892)
(applying an intent-based approach in a statutory context). "It is a familiar rule," wrote
Justice Brewer for the Court, "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Id.
at 459.
44. See, e.g., MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911);
(John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 19--) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY1.
45. The volumes of the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY that will cover the drafting and
ratification of the Bill of Rights have yet to be published. Such problems of source
availability have led to the observation that "[sIcholars have generally focused more on
philosophy and economics than they have on history, partly because of the paucity of
historical evidence of the framers' intent." Treanor, supra note 39, at 811 (footnote omitted).
46. See FORREST MCDONALD, NovuS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTrrUTION 187-88 (1985) (discussing the intellectual traditions of the framers'
generation); see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969) (discussing the same topic).
47. See McDONALD, supra note 46, at 187-88 (discussing British and other intellectual
influences upon certain framers); WOOD, supra note 46, at 10-14 (describing Americans'
appreciation for the English Constitution and political tradition during the Revolution); id.
at 575-76 (illustrating this continued influence upon individuals such as John Adams during
the constitutional period).
48. Some would find this approach preferable to a study that focused upon the framers
themselves. See FISH, supranote 38, at 14; David B. Anders, Justices Harlanand Black Revisited:
The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrTUTION
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tradition, together with some civil law commentary; the American colonial
experience; American Revolutionary and early national history
(approximately 1763-1789); and the Federalist era (1789-1801). The
treatment would not be complete without a brief examination of nineteenth
century developments, which may indicate how courts and legislatures
adopted new, nonoriginal understandings of the phrase.
In this context, the researcher need not confine himself to "Fifth
Amendment law."49 Indeed, he would miss a great deal of relevant
information were he to do so, for the federal government did not actually
exercise its own eminent domain powers until late in the 18 0 0 s .1 Not until
Kohl v. United States,; decided nearly a century after the drafting of the
Fifth Amendment, did a Supreme Court case on a federal taking arise. The
Court, moreover, did not recognize the incorporation of the Takings Clause

Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 904-05 (1993).
49. Such a self-imposed imprisonment could well lead to what one scholar has recently
denounced as "law office history," in which researchers "notoriously pick and choose facts
and incidents ripped out of context that serve their purposes." Martin S. Flaherty, History
"Lite' in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLuM. L. REV. 523, 554 (1995). Flaherty
objects to researchers' failure to immerse themselves completely in both the mindset of an
historical era and in all of the materials that it has to offer, relying instead only upon salient,
well-known documents. Id. at 553-54.
While such a critique is often well warranted, one can nevertheless perceive in Flaherty's
approach to constitutional history a tendency towards Historical Idealism that, taken to its
logical conclusion, could preclude anyone from truly comprehending an historical epoch or
event to which he himself was not party. See MARK T. GILDERHUS, HISTORY AND HISTORIANS
73 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing Benedetto Croce's argument that, in Gilderhus's words, "Iflor
the past to take on vitality and meaning, historians [must) make it come alive with relevance
by rethinking it in their own minds.") See also R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY
(1946) (constituting the most famous statement of Historical Idealism). Such a view would
go far to deny the ability of historical episodes to enlighten us, in any scientific sense, about
present legal (or other) developments. If each event is unique, or consists of myriad
variables too diverse and complex to observe or quantify, or results from factors of which
no empirical evidence even survives, then any attempt to use history to "explain" the
present in positivist terms is probably doomed.
This present article, however, does not purport to discuss at length this perennial
philosophical debate. The author here merely expresses his hope that, in examining what
he believes to be some representative bits of evidence of the history of public use, he has
not done serious damage to the fabric of that history, and has thus avoided becoming a
target of Flaherty's criticism. For other perspectives on this debate within the context of
constitutional history, including the history of property rights, see Richard A. Epstein,
History Lean: The Reconciliationof PrivateProperty and Representative Government, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 591 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past,95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995).
50. See Comment, supra note 27, at 599.
51. 91 U.S. 367 (1876). Kohl involved the federal government's condemnation of a parcel
of land in Cincinnati in order to build a post office. Id. at 368. The Court's unequivocal
opinion quickly killed any doubts about the viability of a federal power of eminent domain.
See id. at 371-75.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until 1896,2
and so the Fifth Amendment provision played little direct role in eminent
domain law in the early years of the republic.
On the other hand, the colonies, and later the states, had similar
provisions in their early laws and constitutions.' These provisions not
only provided a source for James Madison as he drafted what became the
Fifth Amendment,' but help to reveal his generation's understanding of
the phrase. A great deal of eminent domain law, moreover, eventually
proceeded not from constitutions and statutes, but from common law
principles as well. 5
The paucity of federal materials on the early history of public use,
therefore, presents no obstacle to an originalist analysis. At any rate, an
emphasis on mere federal law would discount a history of the doctrine that
reaches back beyond the federal Constitution, before the founding of British
North America and even of the Empire itself, to the early days of Norman
England, and before.
B.

The English and ContinentalBackground

At least one scholar contends that eminent domain got its start in
Biblical times,s6 and these origins were not lost on early United States
judges."' The traditional, and preferable, starting point for American
purposes, however, is English law, particularly that scholar whose work so
shaped American legal thought. From his late eighteenth century vantage
point, looking backward over hundreds of years of English legal
development, Sir William Blackstone made some rather strong statements
about takings in general and public purpose in particular. "So great
moreover is the regard of the law for private property," he wrote, "that it

52. See Comment, supra note 27, at 599-600 n.4.
53. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
54. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 58 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F.Hobson eds.,
1979) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
55. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,555
(1972).
56. Id. at 553; see I Kings 21:2 (King James) ("And IKing) Ahab spake unto Na'both,
saying, Give me thy vineyard, that I may have it for a garden of herbs, because it is near
to my house: and I will give thee for it a better vineyard than it; or, if it seem good to thee,
I will give thee the worth of it in money.") While including an offer of just (apparently, at
least) compensation, Ahab's attempted condemnation may arguably have been for a private
purpose, since the vineyard apparently was to have been devoted to Ahab's own use. Id.
The answer to this issue would most likely turn upon whether the kings of ancient Israel
could rightly say, in the words of Napoleon, "L'tatc'est moi." See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 399 & n.2 (13th ed. 1955). This question the author would not presume to
answer.
57. Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 573.
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will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good
of the whole community.... Besides, the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's private
rights, as modelled by the municipal law.sa
These observations are most useful, revealing as they do the twin
concerns of any inquiry into the meaning of public use: 1) the question of
whether private use is permissible at all (as Jed Rubinfeld would have us
believe),' and 2) the issue of what constitutes public use. In adopting such
unequivocal language, however, Blackstone was overstating his case, since
both Crown and Parliament had long been appropriating private
property,' as Blackstone himself recognized. 6' A chapter in Magna62
Carta, in fact, restricted the king's right to take timber without consent.
The very existence of this provision implies that 1) the Crown had been
doing so before 1215 and 2) that the Crown could, and probably did,
continue to take timber, albeit with consent, afterward. The Crown's power
to take property in order to exercise royal prerogative in areas such as
defense, navigation, foreign affairs, and dispensation of justice, moreover,
is well documented.' Parliament, moreover, clearly exercised an eminent
domain power (although the invention of that term came later)" at least
three centuries before Blackstone wrote.'

58. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone also penned a sentiment
that would have been (and, given the pervasiveness and influence of his volumes, perhaps
was) of great interest to the Brewer court and litigants: "If a new road, for instance, were
to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively
beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without the
consent of the owner of the land." Id.
Blackstone did, however, qualify these pronouncements to a degree. While admitting that
the legislature could "compel the individual" to part with his property, Blackstone
characterized this event not so much as an invasion of property rights as a forced exchange,
in which the former owner received "a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury
thereby sustained ....All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his

possessions for a reasonable price." Id. The owner, in other words, retained the full value
of his property, though not the thing itself, Nevertheless, that Blackstone would proclaim
the utter sanctity of property even in the face of Parliament's undeniable exercise of eminent
domain reveals a certain depth of feeling upon the subject.
59. See Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1079 (theorizing that the phrase "public use" actually
specifies "which takings of property require compensation" rather than "which takings of
property are unconstitutional with or without compensation").
60. See Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 562-66.
61. See supra note 58.
62. MAGNA CARTA OF 1225, ch. 21, in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 53 (Michael
Evans & R. Ian Jack eds., 1984).
63. Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 562-64.
64. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
65. Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 565.
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The areas in which Crown and Parliament acted have obvious
overtones of public benefit, however, even though the public itself might

not have had access to a particular fortification or sewer." An apparent
requirement of at least a public benefit, moreover, if not an actual public

use, appears in the writings of the civil law jurisprudent Hugo Grotius.67
Grotius, who generally receives credit for originating the term "eminent
domain,'" discussed the concept within the context of the sovereign's

powers to conclude a peace.' His treatment of the subject addresses both
the public/private use question and the issue of the breadth of public use.
The property of subjects is so far under the eminent controul of
the state, that the state or the sovereign who represents it, can
use that property, or destroy it, or alienate it, not only in cases of

extreme necessity, which sometimes allow individuals the liberty
of infringing upon the property of others, but on all occasions,
where the public good is concerned, to which the original
of society intended that private interests should give
framers
0
way.7
Because the original word that Grotius employed in his discussion
of public use (utilitas)7" may mean either use or benefit,' the literal
meaning of the passage is open to question. Even if we do regard Grotius's

as the definitive language, it thus provides no help in choosing the broad
or narrow view of public use. At first glance, moreover, this passage also
seems to offer no assistance to one seeking to undercut Rubinfeld's
argument regarding private use.73 Grotius apparently suggests, in these

66. Id. at 564-65.
67. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
68. Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 559.
69. HUGO GRonus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEAcE, bk. 3, at 387-88 (A.C. Campbell
trans., 1901).
70. Id. (emphasis in Campbell translation). Cf. 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS" THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1-15 (rev. 3d. ed. 1994) (quoting a different translation, which reads
in part "in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends
of public utility").
71. The entire section reads in the original as follows:
VII. I. Disputari et hoc solet quid in res singulorum possint pacis causa
statuere qui reges sunt, nec in res subditorum sub eminenti dominio esse
civitas, ita ut civitas, aut qui civitas vice fungitur, iisrebus uti, easque
etiam perdere et alienare possit, non tantum ex summa necessitate, quae
privatis quoque ius aliquod in aliena concedit, sed ob publicam utilitatem,
cui privatas cedere illi ipsi voluisse censendi sunt qui in civilem coetum
coierunt.
at 653 (A.W. Sijthoff 1919) (emphasis added,
HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE BELLI AC PACIS, Jib. III,
footnote omitted).
72. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 2118 (1968).
73. See Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1079.
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words, that even private individuals may appropriate another's property
in cases of necessity.
Within another context, however, this right of private use has a
considerable implied restriction. Earlier in his work, Grotius writes further
of the "extreme necessity" that may allow such an appropriation. 4 The
illustrations he provides of such necessity, although involving nominally
private redistribution, reveal an unmistakable community-or "public"
interest in this redistribution.
[I1f in a voyage provisions begin to fail, the stock of every
individual ought to be produced for common consumption; for
the same reason a neighboring house may be pulled down to
stop the progress of a fire: or the cables or nets, in which a ship
is entangled, may be cut, if it cannot otherwise be disengaged.'
Even Grotius's example of the ship, which was, and remains, a
principal channel for the flow of commerce and transportation,7 6 is not far
removed from the Brewer court's concept of public benefit." From this the
conclusion seems to follow that Grotius believed eminent domain to be
acceptable where a public benefit resulted, even if the use itself were
private. This conclusion seems even more accurate in light of Grotius's
advocacy of price control and government regulation of, or interference
with, the economy and private property.7 8
Grotius's was not, however, the final word on the subject. The
framers' generation also had, by the 1770s, well over a century and a half
of colonial tradition upon which to draw, and this tradition reveals even
more interesting developments in the law of takings.
C.

The American Colonial Experience;The Mill Acts

In 1641, the authors of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties penned
the following provision:
No mans Cattel or goods of what kinde soever shall be pressed
or taken for any publique use or service, unlesse it be by
warrant grounded upon some act of the generall Court, nor
without such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie rates of
the Countrie do afford. And if his Cattel or goods shall perish or

74. GROTiUs, supra note 69, bk. 2, at 92.
75. Id.
76. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993

(1993).
77. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
78. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54-55 (1964).
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suffer damage in such service, the owner shall be sufficiently
recompensed. 9
This provision, appearing 16 years after the original publication of
De lure Belli ac Pacis, 8° suggests that the authors of the Massachusetts
Charter may have drawn upon Grotius's work for the phrase "publique
use," choosing "use" rather than "benefit"as the "correct" translation. On the
other hand, the modern reader should not reflexively read the word "use"
in this passage in its usual, lay meaning; English jurisprudents of the day
could also see in that term a history of beneficial ownership.8' The Puritan
founders of Massachusetts, moreover, also believed in the Christian concept
of "just price"' that one scholar has linked to Grotius's regulatory
sentiments.' The employment of "use" in the charter, therefore, while
reflecting Grotius's influence on this point, does nothing to rule out the
possibility-perhaps the likelihood-that the authors accepted a broad
definition of the term.
State governments' adoption of the term "public use" in the months
and years immediately following the Declaration of Independence likewise
says nothing about its meaning. Just as some state constitutions and
declarations of rights reflexively quoted provisions of Magna Carta
verbatim," so the Massachusetts Body of Liberties might be a
"home-grown" source of express rights, to which constitution-makers might
naturally turn without much analysis. Clearly, they attached some
significance to the "public use" provision (else they would not have
included it within the Revolutionary constitutions); but one may get a more
accurate view of how they understood it by examining contemporary acts.
Of these, one type of legislation in particular stands out: these are the
colonial and state mill acts.'

79. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES § 8 (1641), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 48 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) [hereinafter
SOURCES].
80. See Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 560 n.24.
81. See, e.g., THOMAS BERGIN & PAUL- G.HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND

FUTURE INTERETS 82 (2d ed. 1984).
82. 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES IN AMERICAN

THOuGHT 18 (1973).

83. See Sax, supra note 78, at 54-56; supra note 78 and accompanying text.
84. Compare, eog., N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § XII, reprintedin 7 SOURCES, supra
note 79, at 402-03 ("no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, .. . or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the
land") with MACNA CARTA of 1225, ch. 29, reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 62, at 54 (using essentially the same language).
85. For an overview of the mill acts and their place in legal history, see MORTON
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 47-54 (Oxford Univ. Press
ed., 1992). A briefer treatment appears in Berger, supra note 23, at 206-07.
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In a country where land was readily available,* but sources of
mechanical power lay largely in the flowing of water, 7 governments
understandably showed little reluctance to interfere, sometimes to a large
physical extent, with property ownership rights along rivers and
streams. 88 This riparian property was quite useful, indeed indispensable,
to one who sought to build a water mill; but often, in order to power the
mill, one required a mill pond or some other source of fast-moving
water.'a Such a source might require a dam, which in turn meant that the
dam had to connect to each bank of a river or stream. The trouble came
when one party owned one bank in an area suitable for a dam or pond, and
refused to sell the property to the would-be miller, who, perhaps, owned
the opposite bank. The mill acts provided a governmental solution to this
problem. °
While the first mill act appeared in 1667,"' and states continued to
pass them well into the late 1800s,92 most of the statutes that came into
being before the turn of the nineteenth century are fairly similar.93
Generally, they permitted a party seeking to establish a mill to institute a
condemnation proceeding in order to obtain the necessary parcel of land on
86. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 59.

87. "Before Independence," writes one group of scholars, "only one manufacturing
establishment in America was using a steam engine ....American manufacturers appear
to have preferred the waterwheel to the steam engine as the prime [power source] until
some time in the middle of the last century." Jeremy Atack et al., The Regional Diffusion and
Adoption of the Steam Engine in American Manufacturing, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 281, 281 (1980).
Evidence indicates that even as late as 1860, total horsepower production of American
waterwheels exceeded that of steam engines. Id. at 282 n.10. One should not neglect,
however, the fact that animal sources of power (horses, mules, and oxen) also constituted
a prime power source. JONATHAN HUGHES, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 144-45 (3d ed.
1989).
88. See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
89. See HUGHES, supra note 87,at 145.
90. For a relatively complete list of mill acts through the late 1800s, see Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17 n.* (1884).
91. See Act of Sept. 23, 1667, act 4 [hereinafter Va. Mill Act of 16671, appearing in 2 LAWS
OF VIRGINIA 260 (Waller Hening ed., 1792) [hereinafter LAWS OF VIRGINIA].
92. See Head, 113 U.S. at 17 n.*.
93. See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1719, ch. 15 thereinafter Md. Mill Act of 17191, appearing in
1 LAWS OF MARYLAND 7(1799) [hereinafter MARYLAND LAWS]; Act of Feb. 27, 1796,
thereinafter Mass. Mill Act of 1796], appearing in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 729 (1800) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS LAWS); Act of Feb. 22, 1714, ch. 15
[hereinafter Mass. Mill Act of 1714], appearing in I THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE, OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 729 (1869) [hereinafter ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS]; Act of
1758, ch. 5 [hereinafter N.C. Mill Act of 17581, appearing in COMPLETE REVISAL OF ALL THE
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH CAROLINA 219 (1773) [hereinafter NORTH
CAROLINA ACTS]; Act of 1734, 1738, 1798 [hereinafter RI. Mill Act], Pub. L. 1798, at 504 (R.I.)
[hereinafter R.I. Laws of 17981; Act of Feb. 1745 [hereinafter Va. Mill Act of 1745], appearing
in 5 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 91, at 359.
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the opposite bank or elsewhere." Although the proceeding usually
obligated the future miller to compensate the former owner for the parcel,
it barred any action for damages that the latter might have otherwise have
brought, except an action of debt in the event the mill owner failed to pay
the required compensation." While all the statutes effectively barred the
former owner's use and enjoyment of property.' some went further and
expressly shifted fee simple title to the prospective miller," who was, of
course, a private party.
At first glance, the mill acts would seem to render the public use
limitation nugatory, or at least to suggest that Rubinfeld's thesis about
private use is correct." This is so because even though many of these acts
predate the ratification and incorporation of the Fifth Amendment, many
states had public use provisions at the time the mill acts were in force."
As was the case with Grotius, however, first impressions here are
misleading. A closer examination of the mill acts reveals that they either
expressly or implicitly (usually the former) contemplated that a public
benefit would flow from the establishment of a mill, much as the Brewer
court saw public benefit emanating from private roads." The North
Carolina statute, for example, stated clearly in its title that its purpose was
to provide for the construction of public mills, and it set prices at which the
millers were to grind others' grain.' The 1714 Massachusetts statute
established its scheme in order to benefit millers who had gone to
considerable expense to construct mills "serviceable for the publick
good.""'° The 1667 Virginia statute likewise observed the importance of
the community benefit. Mill construction, stated the statute, would
" 3 Many persons
"conduce much to the convenience of this country.1'
would no doubt undertake to build mills, the law observed, "if not
obstructed by the perversenesse of some persons not permitting others,

94. Va. Mill Act of 1667, supra note 91, at 260-61; N.C. Mill Act of 1758, supra note 93,
at 219. Some acts even allowed a prospective miller to appropriate land apparently
regardless of whether he already owned any riparian property. Md. Mill Act of 1719, supra
note 93.
95. See Mass. Mill Act of 1796, supra note 93, at 729; Mass. Mill Act of 1714, supra note
93, at 730; R.I. Mill Act, supra note 93, at 504-05.
96. See supra note 93.
97. NoC. Mill Act of 1758, supra note 93, at 219; Va. Mill Act of 1745, supra note 93, at
360.
98. See Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1079; see also supra note 34 (describing Rubinfeld's
thesis).
99. See, MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. X, reprinted in 5 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 94;
VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 6, reprinted in 10 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 48, 49.
100. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
101. N.C. Mill Act of 1758, supra note 93, at 219-20.
102. Mass. Mill Act of 1714, supra note 93, at 729.
103. Va. Mill Act of 1667, supra note 91, at 260.
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though not willing themselves to promote soe publique a good.'
While these statutes sometimes provided for the condemnation of
small parcels-typically an acre, and an unimproved one at that-the
appropriation could be much larger. The Maryland act, for example,
permitted the shifting of title to as much as one hundred acres,"° which
was no small plot of ground even in a land-rich country. While here, as in
other acts, the land in question must have been unimproved, 7 this
requirement may have been as much for the protection of a resource-poor
society's economy as for the benefit of the deprived landowner. If the
purpose of promoting mills was to improve the economy, then a mill that
reduced or destroyed valuable improvements would obviously frustrate
this purpose to at least some extent. Had mills been an even greater
economic boon that they already were, the acts' drafters may have been less
forbearing of landowners' rights.
While the mill acts' drafters had a broad concept of public use,
therefore, they nevertheless shied away from the notion that they could
shift title or use of land for purely private purposes. This attitude seemed
a constant from early colonial days through the end of the 1700s,"° and
perhaps beyond."° The question remains, however, of whether the
framers' generation entertained these same sentiments.
D. The Early State and NationalExperience, 1776-1789
While the mill acts are best suited to illustrating the early American
outlook on the breadth of public use, the experiences of the revolutionary
generation, together with commentators on the proposed Constitution,
provide more insight on the issue of whether strictly private use was an
acceptable object of condemnation. One obvious experience that members
of this generation may have remembered with caution was that which they
had had with the confiscation of loyalist lands.' While one could easily
describe such acts as being at least for public benefit, the fact remains that
they were blatant examples of private property appropriation, for whatever
ends. Regardless of the use to which such lands were put, the confiscation
acts undoubtedly showed the power of state governments over property.

104. Id.

105. See, e.g., id.
106. Md. Mill Act of 1719, supra note 93.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 93.
109. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 15, 1865, 1865 Or. Laws 11; see also Head, 113 U.S. at 17 n.*
(listing other nineteenth century mill acts).
110. For a digest of the acts that confiscated loyalist property, see CLAUDE H. VAN TYNE,
THE LOYALIST OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33541 (1959).
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These acts, notes Gordon Wood, "were not the decrees of a tyrannical and
irresponsible magistracy, but laws enacted by legislatures which were
probably as equally and fairly representative of the people as any
legislature in history.""' Such a record of takings could do nothing but
make the people wary of their new governments' power, even though
many of them had not themselves been the objects of its exercise.
The fact that many early state constitutions had qualified eminent
domain clauses... suggests that Americans at once viewed the power as
necessary, perhaps inherent, but nevertheless dangerous and in need of
restraint by consent and just compensation provisions. The essential
question is whether they viewed these clauses as prohibiting private use
altogether, or whether private use, without the compensation required of
public use, was permissible. In light of the extreme jealousy with which
Americans spoke of their interests in the 1780s, the question almost answers
itself in the asking.
Of particular interest to Rubinfeld is the 1780 Massachusetts
provision, which states that:
no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be
taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own
consent, or that of the representative body of the people....
And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of
uses, he shall
any individual should be appropriated to public
113
receive a reasonable compensation therefor.
Rubinfeld makes much of the dichotomy here between taking,
which seems permissible for any use without compensation, and
application to public use, which does require compensation."' This
dichotomy, he argues, supports the notion that takings for private use were
acceptable in the eyes of the framers, or at least of their generation." 5
While the plain meaning of the two sentences in conjunction seems to be as
Rubinfeld suggests,"' an originalist interpretation yields a potentially
different answer.
As William B. Stoebuck has pointed out, however, the
Massachusetts provision's second sentence was added during floor

111. WOOD, supra note 46, at 404.

112. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1,§ 8, reprinted in 2 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 205,
206 ("nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent
of his representatives, and without compensation being made."); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt.
1, art. 10, reprinted in 5 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 94. r
113. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 10, reprinted in 5 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 94.
114. See Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1120.
115. Id.
116. Rubinfeld implicitly uses a plain meaning methodology in his textual analysis. Id.
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debates."" While the vote to add the second sentence could certainly
indicate that the Massachusetts drafters intended just the result that
Rubinfeld perceives, general evidence of the mindset of the period indicates
that this whole provision was simply the result of poor drafting."8 The
Massachusetts mill acts, for example (one of which originated while the
above constitutional provision was in force),1"' showed just the sort of
aversion to private use that Rubinfeld's interpretation of the constitutional
provision apparently allows.' When one moves beyond Massachusetts'
borders, moreover, and approaches the latter years of the decade, one
encounters increasingly strident concerns about the safety of private
property.1 2 This suggests that Rubinfeld's reading of the Massachusetts
constitutional language is incorrect-or, even if Rubinfeld is correct, that
the Massachusetts approach represented the minority view.
'"Those who wish to enjoy the blessings of liberty," wrote
Landholder, an influential New England essayist, in 1788, "mustbe willing
to . . . devote some part of their property to the public use that the
remainder may be secured and protected.""z While possibly concerned
more with taxation than eminent domain,"z Landholder clearly saw the
problem in black and white: the government must apply private property
to public use, or else it could not involve itself with the property.
Landholder, of course, was addressing the questions that the proposed
Federal Constitution had raised in the minds of the people, rather than
interpreting a "public use" provision, but his language here is general, and
readily applicable to public use provisions. At the time Landholder wrote,
the chief sources of both taxation and condemnation were, and had always
been, the states and the colonial governments before them. Deprivation of
property was deprivation of property; the fears that Americans might
harbor about the prospective federal government were probably ones that
they had learned to control with regard to their states by imposing
restraints upon state powers. In this light, then, Landholder and his fellow
commentators reveal at least a bit about how citizens viewed not just
federal, but any, government.
Landholder, who was probably a Federalist, 24 was certainly not
alone in harboring such sentiments. Antifederalists such as William
117. Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 592-93.
118. See supra note 93.
119. See Mass. Mill Act of 1796, supra note 93, at 729; 5 SOURCES, supra note 79, at 13.
120. See Mass. Mill Act of 1796, supra note 93, at 729; Mass. Mill Act of 1714, supra note
93, at 729.
121. See infra notes 122-134 and accompanying text.
122. Essay of Landholder, CONNECTICUT COURANT, Mar. 10, 1788, reprinted in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 367.

123. See Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 585-88.
124. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 561-62.
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Symmes, Jr., were freer in both their criticisms and their defense of
property. The new Constitution, wrote Symmes, would undoubtedly
effectuate a general surrender of all property in the country to the federal
government." While probably an overstatement even without the
illumination of twenty-twenty hindsight, Symmes displays an almost
hysterical jealousy of his interests that many contemporaries shared.
One fear in particular reflects the property-oriented mindset of the
framers' generation. While many Americans viewed the security of private
property as an end of government," this security also served as a means
to government as well. 27 Property gave owners an interest in stable
government"2 ' and often provided them enough subsistence to permit
them to acquire management skills and bring these skills to political
office.' 2 For individuals who recognized these facts, the redistribution of
private property among private quarters would seem both catastrophic in
itself and conducive to further disaster. The common thread seemed to be
that legislators could act in a public capacity to benefit their own private
property interests. Such a scenario is not at all hard to imagine, since this
is exactly what happened in Georgia less than a decade after the
Constitution's ratification (the celebrated Yazoo land fraud)."" The
essential fear was apparently that, since property was power, legislators
could use their public authority to transfer property-real or otherwise-to
themselves, and so become economic (and thus, as a vicious cycle began,
political) tyrants.13'
One commentator feared that Congress's small size would lead to1
this sort of corruption, which in turn would unhinge the security of

125. Letter from William Symmes, Jr., to Peter Osgood, Jr., reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 44, at 107, 111.
126. See Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 585-86 (discussing the Lockean tradition in late 1780s
American political thought).
127. "What one must stress is that the right to property was an unquestioned
assumption of the American Revolutionaries. To assert this is merely to assert that they
were eighteenth-century men. But one must go on to say that they did not defend property
as an end in itself but rather as one of the bases of republican government." Stanley N.
Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467,
469-70 (1976).
128. See CHARLES S. SYDNOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE MAKING: POLITICAL
PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON'S VIRGINIA 109 (1965) [hereinafter SYDNOR, AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARIES]; CHARLES S. SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS: POLITICAL PRACTICES IN

WASHINGTON'S VIRGINIA 123 (1952) [hereinafter SYDNOR, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS].
129. See SYDNOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note 128, at 15-17; SYDNOR,
GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS, supra note 128, at 4-6; infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). For an extended account of
Fletcher and the self-dealing of the Georgia legislature, see generally C. PETER MAGRATH,
YAzOO: LAW AND POLITICS INTHE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
131. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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property and thus endanger fundamental rights 32 Responding to claims
that the relatively equal property distribution in America would lead to
congressional equilibrium, a second writer responded that a small
legislature would be able to upset that distribution." Perhaps the most
pointed of these attacks, however, came from the pen of Centinel, who
called his readers' attention to framer Robert Morris and his dealings with
the Bank of North America. Morris had, Centinel asserted, converted the
bank's assets "to his own and creatures' emolument, and by the aid thereof,
controul[ed] the credit of [Pennsylvania], and dictat[ed] the measures of
government."Im
Despite such fears, curiously, the Constitution's lack of an eminent
domain provision seemed to cause little, if any, concern during the
ratification debates. Even when the question of a bill of rights arose, the
subject drew little attention. In early 1789, James Madison wrote to a
correspondent that the First Congress should prepare "the most satisfactory
provisions for all essential rights. "13 Conspicuously absent from the
suggested list that Madison included in his letter was anything remotely
resembling an eminent domain provision.' 36
Nevertheless, within a few months, Madison introduced in the
House of Representatives his proposed amendments, including a draft of
the Takings Clause."7 The House, however, shared his apparent lack of
concern for the provision, for the records do not indicate any floor debate
in which discussion of the clause figures. On the one occasion when the
132. A Federal Republican, A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 255, 267-68.

reprinted in 14

133. Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 44, at 14, 48.
134. PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Jan. 2, 1798, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY, supra note 44, at 234. For a brief history of this episode, see RICHARD B. MORRIS,
THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 40-42 (1987).

135. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 54, at 404-05.
136. Id. Several weeks earlier, Madison had written Thomas Jefferson that he saw no
need for a Bill of Rights, since he considered that the Constitution reserved all power that
it had not expressly granted. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,1788),
in 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note, at 295-97. If Madison continued to believe this, and saw
the proposal of amendments as a purely political gesture, then the appropriate reading of
the Fifth Amendment's public use clause, at least in Madison's view, is probably as a
threshold requirement (that is, requiring a public use in order to justify a taking). This
interpretation flies in the face of Rubinfeld's thesis that takings for private use are
permissible without compensation. See Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1079.
137. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) ("[N]o person shall ... be obliged
to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation,"). Like some of the state clauses, see supra notes 112-13 and accompanying
text, this wording supports the notion that the government's act of taking may by definition
constitute a public use-the broadest possible interpretation of the phrase.
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entire article came up for debate, the representatives focused their
attentions upon the criminal provisions that later found their way into the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments." The whole tenor of the debate
surrounding ratification, Madison's early reticence in admitting the
existence of implied powers, and the apparent congressional silence on the
provision he finally did propose, suggests one conclusion. Americans,
while fearful for their property, thought that the Takings Clause as finally
engrossed provided them sufficient protection. They would, and did,
apparently, admit the necessity of a broad concept of public use.'- The
idea that they accepted a government power, either state or federal, to take
land for purely private purposes (perhaps with the legislators themselves
as the benefited private parties) runs counter to the general evidence. That
a public purpose was relatively easy to establish, moreover, probably
rendered the comparatively few conceivable cases in which it could not be
established even more objectionable as subjects of takings. Their generation,
then, insisted on some public benefit, although not an actual public
possession or use.
III. THE POST-FOUNDING ORIGINS OF THE RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF "PUBLIC USE"
From whence, then, did the more restrictive view of public use
emanate? One of the early signs of a highly restrictive reading of the whole
concept of eminent domain appears in Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance.1°
In this circuit court case, Supreme Court Justice William Paterson discussed
the takings provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.' A
transfer of property from one private party to another, he wrote, was
justifiable without compensation only in cases of great necessity; he
confessed to encountering difficulty, furthermore, in picturing a scenario
in which the necessity would be so great to require this particular
action."" On the other hand, Paterson did see a compensated shifting of
private property from one private individual to another as more
acceptable.' 4 3
While Justice Paterson's opinion seems to condone, at least in
theory, takings for a private use, he may in fact have been troubled only by
the issues of the actual shifting of the title and compensation. Twice, when

138.
139.
140.
141.
278.
142.
143.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753-54. See also Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 595.
See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, § VIII, reprinted in 8 SOURCES, supra note 79, at
Dorrance,2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310-12.
Id. at 312.
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writing pointedly of legislative shifting of title from private party to private
party, Paterson injects the compensation issue as a limitation upon the
legislature's power to effect this conveyance. "No one," he declares, "can
be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his whole property, real and
personal, for the good of the community, without receiving a recompence
in value."'" And again: "The legislature, therefore, had no authority to
make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in another,
without a just compensation."' The inference is that such an action
would be acceptable, at least in some cases, as long as the original owner
did receive compensation.
Paterson's opinion then goes on-to deny that public necessity could
ever be so great as to justify such an action even with compensation,'1
but then the opinion undercuts itself by entertaining the possibility of the
existence of such a power and describing at length the compensation
necessary in such an instance. "The legislature declare and enact, that such
are the public exigencies, or necessities of the State, as to authorize them to
take the land of A. and give it to B.;" however, "the dictates of reason and
the eternal principles of justice, as well as the sacred principles of the social
contract, and the Constitution, direct, and they accordingly declare and
ordain, that A. shall receive compensation for the land." 147 Next comes a
passage in which Paterson discusses at length the means of fixing the
proper amount of compensation." Here again, the necessity of
compensation, and not the identity of the new owner, seems to be
Paterson's foremost worry. As had Blackstone, therefore,'4 9 Paterson
tempers an unequivocal statement by including a means of making an "end
run" around it. For both Blackstone and Paterson, the substance of this
"end run" was compensation."
Running throughout Paterson's discussion, moreover, is the
concept of, as he calls it, "state necessity." 5' This concept has strong
overtones of public benefit. In Paterson's eyes, furthermore, state necessity
is a sine qua non for a legitimate government transfer of title from one
private party to another. 52 Paterson's statements, therefore, do little to
dispute that the framers saw broad elements of public benefit within the
phrase "public use," or that purely private uses in their view did not suffice
144. Id. at 310.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 311-12.
147. Id. at 312.
148. Id. at 312-15.
149. See supra note 58.
150. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 58, at *140 (stressing the importance of
"indemnification").
151. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 311.
152. Id. at 312.
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to justify condemnation. One seeking the legal (if not the philosophical)
advent of the narrow interpretation, therefore, must look still later in
American history than Dorrance.
The famous 1798 Supreme Court case of Calderv. Bullff comes to
mind as a possibility. It was in Calderthat Justices Samuel Chase and James
Iredell engaged in their dialogue, or rather, debate, upon the nature of
sovereignty:5'4 it was in Calder that Chase made perhaps his most famous
observation. "An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law)," he
declared, "contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot
be considered a rightful exercise of the legislative authority. " lss By way
of illustration, Chase cited several examples of wrongful exercises of
legislative
power, including "a law that takes property from A. and gives
"1 6
it to B., s
Chase made this declaration even in the face of statutes that had
done just that." One may perhaps argue that Chase was unaware of such
acts or, more charitably, that he disagreed with them or viewed the new
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment as establishing a new rule for new
occasions. The latter possibility, however, seems unlikely. Chase's recourse
in his Calder opinion is not to the Constitution but rather to "reason,"
"justice," and "great first principles.," ss One would hope that neither the
meaning of these things, nor Chase's understanding of them, would change
both quickly and drastically simply because of an enactment of positive
law-even if that enactment was a constitution rather than a statute.
At any rate, whether Chase was ignorant of the mill acts' existence,
or was opposed to the philosophy behind them and sought to change the
minds of the people, unfortunately (for Chase) few were listening." 9 The

153. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).

154. Id. at 386-400.
155. Id. at 383.
156. Id.
157. The reference here, of course, is to the mill acts. See supra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text.
158. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 383.
159. Among those who failed, or refused, to hear was Iredell. He observed in Calder,
Some of the most necessary and important acts of Legislation, are ...
founded upon the principle that private rights must yield to public
exigencies. Highways are run through private grounds. Fortifications,
Light-houses, and other public edifices, are necessarily sometimes built
upon the soil owned by individuals. In such, and similar cases, if the
owners should refuse voluntarily to accommodate the public, they must be
constrained, as far as the public necessities require; and justice is done, by
allowing them a reasonable equivalent.
Id. at 400. This certainly seems a "public benefit" rather than a "public use" interpretation.
See supra note 23. For this reason, Iredell would possibly-indeed, probably-have found
the mill acts acceptable exercises of legislative power in light of the benefits that those acts
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passage of the mill acts, for example, continued for years after Calder."a
Not until decades had passed did the tide show signs of turning.
According to some scholars," the doctrine that requirement of
an actual use by the public did not arise until the 1800s, specifically 1837,
in the New York case of Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad."
Fittingly, the case involved one of those many instances in which a state
had invested a railroad corporation with the power to take land for its line,
compensating the landowner in exchange.' 3 Upon this occasion, a
landowner had brought an action against such a corporation for trespass
quare clausum fregit."'This gave the court the opportunity to examine
both the meaning of the term public use and the propriety of a delegation
to a railroad corporation of the power of eminent domain." In a long,
considered opinion, New York Senator John Tracy gave his answers. These
answers reflected a fear of the steam-powered, infernal world of industrial
capital.
When we depart from the natural import of the term "public
use," and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession
and occupation that of public utility, . . . or that still more
indefinite term public improvement, is there any limitation
which can be set to the exertion of legislative will in the
appropriation of private property?'"
"[Sluch a construction of legislative power," Senator Tracy
continued, "is inconsistent with the secure possession and enjoyment of
private property, and repugnant to the language and object of the
constitutional provision."167 The Senator then proceeded to declare that
judicial oversight of the legislation in such circumstances was entirely
appropriate, so that the court might preserve the sanctity of natural
law." Here, then, and not in the pre-industrial world of the framers'
generation, did the narrow view at last emerge.

conferred upon the public, although he did not here mention them.
160. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
161. See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U. L. REv. 615, 617 n.14 (1940); Stoebuck, supra note 55, at 589.
162. 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837). For discussions of Bloodgood and its impact, see SACKMAN,
supra note 70, at 617 n.14.
163. Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 10-11.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 60.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 62.
168. Id. at 62-63.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Tracy's opinion, in a way, typifies American constitutional history.
One may tell a great deal of that history, especially its nineteenth century
chapters, in terms of the contest between government power and vested
rights.'69 In raising a new barrier to government invasions of vested
property interests (as well as to the progress of the railroads), Senator Tracy
joined this battle, aligning himself with such luminaries as John
Marshall" and Joseph Story"' on the one hand and Stephen J.Field on
the other," 2 All were kindred spirits in the vested rights struggle;7 3 in
Senator Tracy's instance, however, the forces of natural law and vested
rights favored a status quo that stood in the way of an on-rushing train.
Ultimately the train prevailed, 74 despite Tracy's holding that the
delegation of the eminent domain power to a private railroad corporation
was improper.7 Within little more than a half a century, the industry had
changed the face of America and transmuted it into a Great Power.' 76 If
the mill acts of earlier generations had promoted the "publick good"' 77 in
some broad commercial sense, then giant industry-whatever evils
accompanied it--did far more in this direction as the United States swiftly
became an industrial leviathan. 7 In strictly economic terms, then, the
greater public return would, consistent with early views of public use,
justify greater invasions of private property rights. Just as a pastoral,
agrarian and water-driven society gave way to the hell of steam and
industry, so, too, did the narrow doctrine of public use which that society
raised to defend itself fall before the predominant, unchanging public
benefit theory." To those favoring the sanctity of private property, this
no doubt came as a blow, especially since legislatures have discovered

169. See, e.g., CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 88-95,145-65

(1965).
170. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624 (1819)
(Marshall, C.J.); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); HAINES, supra note 169, at
90-91 (describing Marshall's adherence to vested rights doctrines in these and other cases).
171. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 583 (1837)
(Story, J., dissenting); Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 666 (Story, I.).
172. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,83 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
173. See notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
175. Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 71-72.
176. See WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME
AND ABROAD SINCE 1750, at 149 (1989); FOSTER R. DULLES, AMERICA'S RISE TO WORLD POWER

1 (1955).
177. See Mass. Mill Act of 1714, supra note 93, at 729.
178. JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH, 1877-1890, at 80-98 (1968).
179. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
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many more occasions for eminent domain in the twentieth century."s In
general terms, however, the doctrine that has developed in conjunction
with this trend is consistent with the original American concept, which
appeared in colonial, revolutionary, and early national days, that while
"public use" was necessary, "public use" actually meant public benefit--of
almost any conceivable kind.

180. See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-35.

